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Property Law.  Pollack v. 217 Indian Avenue, L.L.C., 222 A.3d 478 
(2019).  A Rhode Island court will not grant specific performance to 
implement a restrictive land covenant, even when the covenant is 
violated, if such injunctive relief would be futile.  Although the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed its earlier decisions granting 
seemingly harsh injunctive relief in order to enforce property 
serivitudes, the Court will not grant injunctive relief when such 
relief would result in no benefit to the plaintiff and force the 
defendant to demolish a house only to rebuild it.  
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In the winter of 2017, the defendants, Jane and James Moore, 
knocked down their one-story, oceanfront home in Portsmouth, 
Rhode Island, and began constructing a new three-story structure 
without gaining approval from their subdivision’s committee.1  The 
Moore’s property was part of a 1960 subdivision plan that included 
a restrictive land covenant.2  The covenant provided that “[n]o 
building or buildings should be erected, placed or altered on any lot 
until construction plans and specifications, and the plans showing 
the location of the structure have been approved in writing by a 
committee” in order to ensure “quality of workmanship and 
materials” and to protect the “harmony of external design with 
existing structures.”3   
The subdivision’s committee was composed of the nine 
subdivision property owners, and a simple majority was sufficient 
to approve new construction plans.4  However, the defendants did 
not seek committee approval prior to commencing construction, so 
the plaintiff, Bruce Pollack, notified the defendants of their 
violation and demanded they cease and desist construction.5  When 
1. Pollack v. 217 Indian Ave., L.L.C., 222 A.3d 478, 480 (R.I. 2019).
2. Id. at 480.
3. Id. at 480, 483.
4. Id. at 480.
5. Id.
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the defendants failed to stop, the plaintiffs filed suit against Jane 
and James Moore and their real estate L.L.C. in Newport County 
Superior Court seeking a temporary restraining order and a 
preliminary injunction to stop construction.6  The plaintiffs also 
sought damages for the defendant’s violation of the covenant of 
quiet enjoyment.7   
In June, the defendants gained retroactive approval of their 
construction plans with a committee vote of 8–1 and consequently 
moved for summary judgment.8  The plaintiff filed a cross-motion 
for summary judgment arguing that the restrictive covenant 
requires prior approval and urging the court to recognize the 
Restatement Third of Property: Servitudes § 6.10, which states that 
a committee does not have the power to amend a restrictive 
covenant without the approval of the adversely affected property 
holder when the amendment does not apply uniformly.9  In a bench 
trial, the Superior Court granted the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment, holding that the restrictive covenant did not 
require prior approval but rather was flexible enough to allow 
committee approval at any point up to the completion of 
construction.10  The defendants appealed to the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court, and the Court returned the case to the regular 
calendar for full argument after determining that the plaintiff had 
shown cause that the case should not be summarily dismissed.11   
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 480–481.
9. Id. at 480 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.10 
(AM. LAW INST. 2000)).  The plaintiffs also urged the Court to recognize § 6.13 
of the Third Restatement Property: Servitudes, which states that the commit-
tee owes subdivision members a duty of good faith and fair dealing.  Id. at 481 
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.13).  Thus, the plaintiff 
argued that he should have been given notice and the opportunity to object to 
the construction, but because he did not name the committee members as de-
fendants, the Court treated the issue as waived.  Id. 481 n.4.  
10. Pollack, 222 A.3d at 480–81.  The defendants also filed a motion to
dismiss themselves as defendants in their personal capacities that the hearing 
judge ruled was moot when he granted their motion for summary judgment.  
Id.  
11. Id. at 481.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
 On review, the Court sought to resolve two issues: whether 
the land covenant created an express or implied right to gain 
approval for construction plans and design specifications 
retroactively, and, if the covenant did not create such a right, 
whether equitable relief was appropriate.12  Recognizing that 
restrictive land covenants should be interpreted both by giving 
words their “plain and ordinary meaning” and by balancing the 
competing objectives of maintaining the free alienability of land 
and respecting the purposes for which the restriction was 
established, the Court determined that the language of the 
covenant required approval prior to commencing construction.13  
Thus, the Court disagreed with the hearing justice who had 
concluded that the covenant allowed approval in the middle of 
construction; however, the Court affirmed the ruling of the trial 
court after determining that equitable relief was not appropriate in 
this case.14   
 The Court declined to grant equitable relief because such 
relief would be futile.15  The Court noted that a court of equity may 
refuse to grant specific performance when the result would provide 
the plaintiff with no benefit, yet impose substantial inconvenience 
and expense on the defendant.16  In order to enforce the land 
covenant, the Court would have to order the demolition of a house 
that the defendants could simply rebuild because they have since 
gained the committee’s approval for their construction plans.17  The 
plaintiff would gain no relief because the structure he seeks to 
demolish can be rebuilt, and the defendants would face substantial 
costs and inconvenience to demolish the home they have already 
built, only to rebuild another identical house in its place.18  As such, 
12. Id. at 480, 482 n.6.  Although the plaintiff included a plea for damages
in his complaint and reasserted the plea at oral arguments, the Court did not 
consider his claim for damages because he cited no law or claim of error in his 
briefings that would entitle him to such relief.  Id. at 482 n.6.  
13. Id. at 483 (quoting Gregory v. State Dep’t of Mental Health, 495 A.2d
997, 1001 (R.I. 1985)). 
14. Id. at 482–83.
15. Id. at 484.
16. Id. at 483.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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the Court decided to exercise its discretion and denied specific 
performance.19   
 The Court proceeded to distinguish the case from Cullen v. 
Tarini20 and Rose Nulman Park Foundation v. Four Twenty 
Corporation21: two cases in which the Court ordered harsh 
equitable relief in order to enforce property servitudes.22  The Court 
noted that, in Cullen and Nulman, equitable relief was harsh, but 
not futile.23  The Cullen remedy was not futile because the 
restrictive covenant detailed specific building requirements.24  
Thus, when the Cullen Court ordered the defendants to renovate 
and bring their house in compliance with the covenant, the 
defendants could not simply revert to their old specifications by 
getting the old design approved like the defendants here.25  The 
Court also noted that the purpose of the Cullen covenant was 
fulfilled by ordering equitable relief because the covenant was 
created to preserve the plaintiff’s view, whereas the covenant here 
was created to ensure quality materials and aesthetics.26  Thus, the 
purpose of the covenant here was fulfilled by the committee’s 
retroactive approval of the design plans even though the defendants 
failed to obtain approval and begin construction in the correct 
order.27  Similarly, the Court’s order in Nulman to remove a $1.8 
million house that was encroaching on the neighboring property 
was harsh but not futile because once the encroachment was 
removed, the land boundaries were once again respected.28   
 As such, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment because the requested relief would not merely 
be harsh but also futile.  Since the homeowners ultimately obtained 
19. Id.
20. Cullen v. Tarini, 15 A.3d 968, 983 (R.I. 2011).
21. Rose Nulman Park Found. v. Four Twenty Corp., 93 A.3d 25, 33 (R.I.
2014). 
22. Pollack, 222 A.3d at 483–84.
23. See id. (citing Nulman Park Found., 93 A.3d at 28; Cullen, 15 A.3d at
975, 980). 
24. Id. at 483 (citing Cullen, 15 A.3d at 975).
25. Id. at 483–84.
26. Id. at 484 (citing Cullen, 15 A.3d at 975).
27. Id.
28. Id. (citing Nulman Park Found., 93 A.3d at 26–28).
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approval for their construction, they could rebuild their home in the 
exact specifications even if the Court granted equitable relief.29 
COMMENTARY 
 The Rhode Island Supreme Court displayed that their harsh 
line on enforcing property servitudes is not without limit.  The 
equitable remedies in Cullen and Nulman were no less extreme 
than the proposed relief here, but because the plaintiff would not 
receive any benefit from the destruction of the Moore’s home other 
than pure vindication, the Court determined that equitable relief 
was inappropriate.30  At first glance, the result seems to leave the 
plaintiff remediless even though the defendants clearly violated the 
restrictive land covenant.  The plaintiff was not protected by the 
covenant in the way he may have anticipated when buying his 
property.  The plaintiff’s next-door neighbors were able to replace 
an unobtrusive one-story house with a three-story structure 
without affording the plaintiff the opportunity to object to the 
construction before it was too late.31  However, the plaintiff’s lack 
of remedy seems to reflect the plaintiff’s error rather than the 
Court’s stance on enforcing restrictive land covenants.  The Court 
noted that it would not consider the plaintiff’s claim for damages 
because he cited no support for his claim.32  The Court also declined 
to consider adopting § 6.13 of the Restatement Third Property and 
hold the committee accountable for breaching their duty of good 
faith to the plaintiff because the plaintiff failed to name the 
committee members in his complaint.33  Consequently, the Court 
was left to consider a rather irrational request for equitable relief. 
Therefore, the Court’s denial of any relief here does not appear to 
reflect the Court’s opinion on the severity of violating restrictive 
land covenants, but rather the plaintiff’s own errors in arguing and 
requesting relief.  
29. Id.
30. Id. at 483–84.
31. By the time the committee approved of the plans, the house had been
under construction for six months.  Id. at 480.  We can only speculate what 
may have happened if the defendants had followed the proper protocols, but 
perhaps the other neighbors would have been more responsive to the plaintiff’s 
objections had the house not already been half-built.  
32. Id. at 482 n.6.
33. See id. at 481 n.4.
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 Despite considering two issues on appeal, the Court focused 
the majority of its opinion on determining if equitable relief was 
appropriate and devoted almost no time to explaining why the 
language of the covenant required prior approval.  The Court states, 
without further explanation, “we agree with the plaintiff that . . . 
the restrictive covenant provides that a landowner must obtain the 
committee’s written approval prior to erecting a structure on a 
lot.”34  And, although the language of the covenant does seem 
rather clear, the covenant provides that “[n]o building or buildings 
shall be erected . . . until construction plans . . . have been 
approved,”35 the hearing justice determined that the language was 
ambiguous enough to create a “fluid process where approval may be 
gained in the middle of construction.”36  Consequently, it is unclear 
why the Court disagreed with the hearing justice’s interpretation 
of the land covenant because the Court determined that the request 
for equitable relief here was so absurd that the defendants were 
entitled to summary judgment anyway.  
CONCLUSION 
 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that enforcing the 
Indian Avenue restrictive land covenant through equitable relief 
was not appropriate because granting such relief would be futile. 
Although the defendants violated the restrictive land covenant, if 
the Court granted equitable relief and ordered the destruction of 
the house, the defendants could simply rebuild the house 
afterwards.  Such an order would grant the plaintiff no real relief, 
and the defendants would face substantial costs; therefore, 
equitable relief was inappropriate.  
 Shannon Griffin 
34. Id. at 482.
35. Id. at 480 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 481.
